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Abstract
This chapter offers a long‐overdue semiotic analysis of the phenomenon of conscience. It 
is remarkable that such an analysis has not yet been attempted, because conscience has 
always been understood as something like a voice signing, and not just unimportantly, 
but as the voice of God. One could well have expected that an analysis of conscience 
would have been first on the semiotician’s tick list. Using Martin Heidegger’s phenom‐
enological analysis of conscience as a guide, it turns out that a simple Peircean analysis 
in terms of representamen, object and interpretant is at least a good way of opening the 
phenomenon up with the semiotician’s tools. My conclusions point to the uniqueness 
of the sign of conscience among all signs. For it is one sign where all three moments— 
representamen, object and interpretant—are the very same entity. Given the existential 
semiotic reduction—without remainder—of the subject to a structured network of signs, 
one can then glimpse the extraordinary conclusion that in the phenomenon of conscience 
we encounter the signing of semiosis itself—the sign of signs. It is no wonder, then, that 
it has been understood to be the voice of God. I finish by developing the ethical ramifica‐
tions of my analysis for semiotics.
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1. Introduction
It is very remarkable that a semiotic analysis of conscience has not yet been attempted. 
Conscience has always been understood as something like a voice signing—but not just any 
voice: it has largely been identified with the signing of the voice of God, expressing God’s law, 
intentions, thoughts, etc., or the law of God ‘written on our hearts’.1 One may have thought, 
therefore, given its potential importance that it would have been first on the semiotician’s 
1Romans 2:15.
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ticklist for analysis. In fact, quite the reverse appears to have been the case, and even moral 
philosophers, on whose conceptual territory conscience traditionally has been thought to lie, 
appear to have left the topic well alone over the last half‐century. There has been very little in 
the way of comprehensive and systematic attempts to elaborate theories of conscience since 
Heidegger made it central to his existential analysis of Dasein in Being and Time [1].
This lacuna needs explanation. Langston [2], in his historical survey of theories of  conscience, 
suggests that the turn away from faculty psychology left no room for conscience as a  psychical 
component. But this is unlikely to be a sufficient explanation, because it is not necessary to posit 
conscience as a faculty, and, certainly, Heidegger’s account in no sense at all  attributes to the phe‐
nomenology of conscience anything like the properties of being a psychical  component. I suggest, 
rather, that theorising about conscience became problematic largely because it had always been 
understood as a totalising and authoritarian phenomenon that the shift towards disseminated 
subjectivity, deconstruction of conceptual hierarchies, and  suspicion of power relations found 
almost impossible to accommodate. Scepticism towards the authority of conscience has been com‐
pounded in the last decades by the terror wreaked by some claiming to ‘follow their consciences’.
It may be thought to be paradoxical that Heidegger’s existential epistemology, which roots 
knowing in Dasein’s modes of being, both contains a highly‐developed theory of conscience, 
and at the same time sows the seeds of its conceptual demise. In fact, I will try to show that 
this paradox points at the heart of a renewed semiotics of conscience.
I will argue that the phenomenon of conscience points us towards the origin of semiosis 
and thus that a semiotic analysis of the phenomenon gives us insight both into the concept 
of  conscience itself and into fundamental semiotic operations. I will also suggest that the 
 analysis can open the way towards a genuinely ethical or critical theory of signs.
2. Heidegger: conscience as the call of being
Many of the most powerful tools of semiotic analysis derive from structuralist accounts of 
meaning. Conscience, I suggest, however, is a sui generis concept that cannot be  embedded 
within the usual patterns of signification. As such, it lends itself much more appropriately 
to phenomenological rather than structuralist analysis. So I am going to use Heidegger’s 
 phenomenological account as a route of access for my own semiotic analysis. This route will 
make clear precisely why the tools of the structuralist are inapplicable here.
In Being and Time [1], first published in 1927, Heidegger makes the concept of conscience 
a centrally important component of his so‐called ‘existential analysis of Dasein’. I will take 
the term Dasein to refer, perhaps controversially, to the set of ontological preconditions that 
enable the experience of being as such and thus that enable the sort of experience that, among 
the animal kingdom, might be thought to be unique to humans: the sort of experience that 
accompanies being‐a‐self.
All of these preconditions are rooted fundamentally in the phenomenon that Heidegger describes 
under the title of ‘care’: Dasein is a being whose being matters to it, who cares about its being, who 
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is concerned about how its existence or its life ‘goes’. All our experience, according to Heidegger, 
is wholly determined by this basic characteristic; indeed, it is this characteristic that enables in 
the first place human experience. If it was not for our care for ourselves, we would have no expe‐
rience—in the sense we have it—at all; things would not ‘show up’ for us in the way that they 
do. Of course, some other form of experience might be possible, the experience associated with 
the being of nonhuman animals, perhaps, but not that of the distinctively human animal. Things 
are disclosed to us, according to Heidegger, only within the horizons mapped out by the matter‐
ing of our concerns. Only insofar as we are concerned about something for the sake of ourselves 
can things connected in significance relations to that something first ‘show up’. The hammer 
does not become an object of experience at all until it gets embedded in the relations of use that 
are organised around those goals of ours that can be accomplished by hammering—building a 
house, putting up a picture, etc. It may nevertheless be in our visual field—but we do not see it, 
that is, notice it, unless it takes a significance upon itself from the projects that we are commit‐
ted to for the sake of ourselves. This is not simply to say that there would not be any hammers 
if we did not need to make them to use as tools to achieve certain projects that we might have. 
Even if there are hammers all around us, whether they are disclosed in our experience, and the 
significance that the bear if they are, is determined by the projects that we are engaged with in 
virtue of the fact that we are concerned about how our existence is going.
Conscience, as Heidegger describes it, turns out to be a ‘primordial’ result of the phenomeno‐
logical structure of care. To see how, one needs beforehand Heidegger’s concept of angst. The 
primordial anxiety that Heidegger refers to with this term is also a basic function of Dasein’s 
being as care: we are always worried about how our lives are going for ourselves; our exis‐
tence is given over to us in such a way as to make us responsible for it, whether we like it or 
not. Anxious about anxiety itself, we ‘flee’ this ultimate concern into the relative safety and 
peace of other people’s conceptions of what we should do and what values we should hold. 
To avoid having to take responsibility for ourselves, we ‘fall prey’ by allowing ourselves to 
become lost in the public discourse of ‘the they’—of others in general. Such anxiety is awak‐
ened by the short amount of time we have before our deaths, and thus by the definitiveness 
of the projects we choose to act upon for defining who we amount to. To escape, we embrace 
what Heidegger calls an ‘inauthentic’ mode of being, defining ourselves dishonestly by the 
categories and values handed to us conveniently by others.
In the clamour of this everyday situation with its gossip and idle chatter, or, in semiotic 
terms, with its semiotic web of dissimulated and meaningless meanings, conscience is dis‐
closed as an urgent and persistent call. Continuing the tradition of interpreting conscience 
as a voice, Heidegger analyses the phenomenon into three moments: the call (that is, the 
message), the caller and the one summoned by the call. Heidegger’s key claim is that these 
three moments are all in fact one entity ontologically: Dasein as care. He writes: ‘the caller is 
Dasein anxious…about its potential… The one summoned is also Dasein, called forth to its 
ownmost potential…And what is called forth by the summons is Dasein, out of falling prey 
to the they…’ (p. 2772). And thus: ‘The call of conscience…has its ontological possibility in the 
fact that Dasein is care in the ground of its being’ (p. 278).
2Pagination here and henceforth is from the German edition (Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag; 2001).
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The anxiety of care thus cuts both ways, it seems, for Heidegger, pushing us both to fall prey to 
others, and also to retrieve ourselves for an authentic mode of being that grasps clearly the respon‐
sibility we bear for ourselves which we are unable genuinely to escape from. The more we cover 
over our possible authenticity by immersing ourselves in the publicness of others, the ‘louder’ the 
call potentially is, since the disjunction between Dasein’s situation and its potential gets starker.
Thus, conscience, for Heidegger, is not a psychological faculty, added on, by whatever 
 mechanism, to Dasein’s cognitive architecture to give it a moral compass for navigating a 
social environment; it is rather a fundamental necessity of its being, of any being that is like 
it ontologically. If Dasein had no conscience, it would have no experience of being at all; it 
would not be a site of the disclosure of a world. That is not to say that Dasein cannot be psy‐
chopathic; i.e., can feel no regret and no empathy in its mistreatment of others; but whether 
it is psychopathic or not, it is concerned for its being, and thus calls itself back from its flight 
away from its responsibility for itself.
Note that Heidegger is importantly wholly unspecific about the form of life that an authentic 
mode of being should take; if he were not, he would precisely not be describing an authentic 
mode of being that is chosen by Dasein itself in the full realisation of its responsibility for itself.
(It is worth remarking that the vocabulary of conscience slips out of Heidegger’s texts after the 
publication of Being and Time in 1927. A ‘call of being’ remains, however, a continual refrain 
throughout his later texts. For illustration, take this powerful but enigmatic passage from 
his Letter on Humanism (first published in 1947): ‘The human being is the shepherd of being. 
Human beings…gain in that they attain the truth of being. They gain the essential poverty of 
the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by being itself into the preservation of 
being’s truth. The call comes as the throw from which the thrownness of Dasein derives’ [3]. 
I have argued elsewhere [4] that the motif of the call of being retains all the conceptual import 
of the analysis of conscience in Being and Time, and thus that this figure of thought remains an 
integral part of Heidegger’s thinking throughout his philosophical engagement).
3. The triune sign
In order to submit the concept of conscience to semiotic analysis, I will use Heidegger’s  pheno 
menological researches as a guide. Whilst this methodology may still, at this point, appear ad 
hoc, it will quickly become clear how conscience is a sui generis semiotic phenomenon that does 
not stand in the familiar relationships to other signs, and thus cannot straightforwardly be 
submitted to structuralist methods of analysis.
Peirce distinguished the following three elements of the sign: 1. the representamen—the sign 
vehicle, or form that the sign takes; 2. the interpretant—the sense conveyed by the sign; 3. 
the object—the referent that the sign stands for [5]. Applied to the concept of conscience as 
Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses would have it, these distinctions yield:
1. The representamen/sign‐vehicle is no word, no gesture, no grapheme. Heidegger rather in‐
sists: ‘The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is 
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not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence’ 
(p. 273). This cannot mean, however, that conscience does not sign. Rather, in  apparent 
contradiction to Hjelmslev’s maxim ‘there can be no content without an  expression, or ex‐
pressionless content; neither can there be an expression without a content, or content‐less 
expression’ [6], silence is its vehicle, its form of expression. Phenomenologically, talking of 
silence here, is not, of course, to assume that conscience could ever have been conceived 
by thinkers as making a noise. The point rather is to draw attention to the fact that the call 
of conscience adds nothing more to that which is there already as the concernful—that is, 
caring—being of Dasein. I.e., properly speaking, the vehicle of the conscience‐sign just is 
Dasein as authentically concerned about its falling prey. It has no more form or content 
than that.
2. The interpretant/sense conveyed by the silent call of conscience is the inescapability and 
necessity of Dasein’s responsibility for its being about which it is ultimately concerned. 
The inauthentic mode of disclosure fails, ultimately, to hide this. Inauthenticity is, rather, 
revealed to be just one more way of taking care, albeit one that precisely tries to shirk its 
ultimate responsibility. What the sense of conscience thus amounts to, then, is just Dasein’s 
authentic liability.
3. The object/referent that the call of conscience stands for, or refers to, finally, is Dasein’s 
authentic mode of being, in which it takes care of itself in full realisation of its ultimate 
responsibility for its finite existence. This is the ‘thing’ to which the call of conscience 
 inexorably draws attention.
In sum, then, for the conscience‐sign, the sign vehicle, the sense and the referent of the sign 
are all the same thing: Dasein in its authentic mode. The moments of the conscience‐sign are 
ontologically identical. This makes conscience, I suggest, unique among signs, sui generis; it 
is a triune sign.
It might be riposted that in this case it cannot be a sign at all, at least not in the traditional 
sense because a sign, at the very least, must refer to something other than itself. But this 
would be a difficult view to sustain: not only is it self‐evident that in conscience something 
is given to understand, hence signified, and thus that there must be some semiosis going 
on; also, it appears plausible—as I have attempted to show—to separate out in the analysis 
of conscience the different moments corresponding to Peirce’s triadic analysis of the sign. 
A semiotic analysis of conscience is possible. Thus, a better conclusion would seem to be that 
we have here a case of a liminal sign, a sign at the boundary of semiosis, a sign from the point 
at which semiosis begins or ends. A sign that stands right on the boundary of the ‘unlimited 
semiosis’ that weaves the semiosphere.3 Conscience, I suggest, is a special sort of sign, but a 
sign nonetheless.
3Lotmann coins this very useful term in his [7], defining it as ‘the semiotic space, outside of which semiosis cannot 
 exist’. He conceives it as the set of structural preconditions of any semiotic operation at all: ‘only the existence of such a 
universe‐the semiosphere‐makes the specific signatory act real.’
Semiotics of Conscience
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.68693
21
Interpreting conscience in this way, however, does draw into question Saussure’s principle 
of the arbitrariness of the sign [8]. Once the signified and the signifier are united in the way 
 indicated, there is no room for any arbitrariness in the representation of the sign: the call of 
conscience cannot in principle take any form other than that which it in fact takes. Again, 
 however, this need not be propounded as a counterexample, so much as a limiting case. 
The conscience‐sign is just especially dense, a sort of black hole of semiosis. On a Peircean 
 taxonomy it could possibly be construed as a special sort of indexical sign, indexicals being, for 
Peirce, those signs that support a wholly non‐arbitrary and thus natural or direct  connection 
between the representamen and the object, and thus ‘direct the attention to their objects 
by blind compulsion’ [9]. The immediacy of ‘blind compulsion’ perhaps captures well the 
 irresistible urgency of the summons of conscience. But unlike other indexicals, in the con‐
science‐sign, not only is there such a direct relation between the representamen and the object 
as to be a relation of identity, the interpretant is also ontologically identical to its representa‐
men and object. That it is semiotically sui generis is, I think, a more convincing conclusion.
It is also worth highlighting that in this account of conscience the emitter and the interpreter 
of the call are one and the same, too—albeit, for Heidegger, the same entity in different modes: 
‘the caller is Dasein anxious…about its potential… The one summoned is also Dasein, called 
forth to its ownmost potential’ (p. 277).
4. Semiosis: a con‐science analysis
Now since the unusual is often what best shows us what is usual, just as pathologies  illuminate 
functional health, it is worth attempting to see what the possibility of the sort of sign that 
I have roughly suggested conscience to be indicates about the processes of semiosis and 
 meaning in general.
In the first place, it is important to distinguish what could be termed internalist and  externalist 
theories of conscience. An externalist theory would be one in which the originator of the 
 conscience‐sign would be something ontologically separate from the interpreter. Cardinal 
John Henry Newman’s claim that conscience is the ‘voice of God’ [10] would be an example 
of the commitments of such a theory. On an account like this, conscience is interpreted by the 
agent to which the voice is addressed, but the voice itself originates from ‘outside’ the agent, 
in this case, in the agency of God. On Erich Fromm’s two consciences theory, on the other 
hand, the authoritarian conscience derives from the external persona of the authority figure, 
and the humanistic conscience derives from humans’ internal capacity for love, freedom and 
flourishing [11]. So this would be an example of a theory of conscience that is both internalist 
and externalist in different respects. For a purely semiotic account, however, this distinction 
is irrelevant, since we have only to do with the significance of the sign itself and its interpreta‐
tion rather than the provenance or emission of it.
Suppose that Heidegger is right about the phenomenology of conscience as we outlined it 
above. In that case, it would appear that the conscience‐sign arises at the intersection between 
two ‘modes of disclosure’: inauthentic and authentic being. In each of these modes, things, all 
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things, are disclosed as determined in a particular way—either by the publicness of the ‘they’, 
or by Dasein’s ‘ownmost’ potential; that is, things take on a particular significance or meaning 
depending on how Dasein’s care for itself is manifesting itself. But as the two fundamental 
modes of disclosure, this must mean that semiosis in general is a function of Dasein’s concern for 
itself; i.e., significance as such is a particular and general result of the projects, cares, concerns, 
inclinations, motivations—and all those psychological phenomena that can go under the rubric 
of desire in its widest sense—that Dasein manifests. Derrida moots such a view in the opening 
section of Of Grammatology [12], despite his insistence that the structures of language are basic 
to meaning. Language acts as a repository of meaning, certainly, but it is not more, on this view, 
than a medium of the origination of meaning—not the originator itself. Heidegger saw the same 
thing: ‘In this way language is the language of being, as clouds are the clouds of the sky. With 
its saying, thinking lays inconspicuous furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous 
than the furrows that the farmer, slow of step, draws through the field’ [13]. Language, even in 
its widest sense of semiosis in general, is not ontologically prior to meaning and signification; it 
is rather the system or expression of significance and meaning that itself is grounded in human 
concern for self. It is the latter that first makes possible humans’ particularly human experience. 
The cares that humans have and the projects grounded therein thus first make semiosis pos‐
sible, and sustain it. Language merely records its particular configurations for posterity.
On this view, Saussure’s proposal of a general theory of signs [14], then, would amount to a 
semiotic equivalent of Heidegger’s phenomenological ‘existential analyses’. Here, Heidegger 
interprets the ‘world’ of Dasein’s experience in terms of the networks of meaning generated 
by Dasein’s concernful projection onto future possibilities of action, projections which express 
its concern for itself. For example, the thing becomes significant as a hammer only within 
the context of the potential hammering‐uses with which Dasein might concern itself: put‐
ting up a house for shelter, putting up a work of art to appreciate, etc. Wholly independent 
of these sorts of concern, the thing cannot be a hammer at all. The linguistic sign ‘hammer’ 
functions, on the other hand, merely as the fixer, not the determiner, of this web of potentiali‐
ties, enabling the communication, by conventional codes, between Daseins of the hammer’s 
significance to its concernful being‐in‐the‐world.
The two fundamental modes of disclosure—authenticity and inauthenticity—amount thus to two 
basic determinations of the semiosphere as a whole: authentic and inauthentic  semiosphere. 
If conscience is the sign that discloses to inauthentic Dasein the mode of being of authentic‐
ity, then we are warranted in drawing the following stark conclusion: conscience is the signing 
of semiosis as such, the sign of signs. It reveals the entirety of the semiosphere as determined 
inauthentically or authentically. It would be for this reason that it is a sign sui generis; it stands 
above and apart from the semiosphere as the sign which represents the semiosphere itself to 
concernful thinking and communication, thus imbuing it with an  overarching  meaning. It is 
the vertical limit, the stopping point, so to speak, of ‘unlimited semiosis’ that is only unlimited 
‘horizontally’. There is a sense then, insofar as it transcends the signing‐process whilst signing 
itself, that is it analogous to the voice of God, at least to the extent that it performs the function 
of ultimately determining the semiosphere’s overriding meaning. Just as the concept of the 
voice of a transcendent God is oxymoronic, so the sign of conscience is both sign and beyond 
signification as its ultimate arbiter.
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The same conclusion can be reached from a different direction. Our semiotic deployment of 
Heidegger’s insights produced the result that Dasein in its authentic mode is the representa‐
men, the object and the interpretant of conscience all at once. But given our phenomeno‐
logical interpretation of semiosis in terms of Dasein’s concernful disclosure, and given the 
existential semiotic reduction—without remainder—of the subject to a structured network 
of signs (Duits, Tarasti et al. [15, 16], but also Derrida, Barthes, etc.), there is nothing else for 
conscience to sign but the semiosphere as such. Dasein can be construed as reducible without 
remainder to the possible structures that conform the semiosphere. Thus, the authentic Dasein 
signified in conscience is not ontologically distinguishable from the structures that conform 
authentic semiotic disclosure. Conscience must be construed to signify the semiosphere such 
as it authentically is.
5. Towards ethical semiosis
In this final part, I want to point towards what I take to be the possibility of a genuinely ethi‐
cally engaged semiotics that is rooted in this conclusion. The hope is that this would amount 
adequately to a critical semiotics, a semiotics with the conceptual resources to justify claims 
critical of systems of signs, of processes of semiosis, of individual signs and of the semio‐
sphere as such, and thus to point towards better semiotic alternatives.
The normativity of conscience, I suggest, binds Dasein in two distinguishable aspects: as inter‐
preter and as agent.
5.1. Qua interpreter
In the first place, it is important to be clear about the nature of the normative demand that 
conscience makes. Heidegger, as we have seen, construes it as a ‘summons’ to the authen‐
tic mode of disclosure. A summons, in the usual sense, has judicial power behind it; in this 
case, however, rather than being summoned to face judgement, the summons constitutes the 
judgement. But what is the justification for the summons? What is its warrant? Why should 
Dasein obey? The answer for Heidegger is that Dasein’s being as care for itself cannot but both 
summon and heed the summons; it cannot ultimately tolerate its lostness in the ‘they’. Its 
call is warranted because Dasein of necessity accepts the presupposition on which it is based: 
that Dasein cares about its existence. But such a conception runs into obvious difficulties 
connected to the rigor of this binary opposition authentic/inauthentic. For example, what if 
Dasein authentically decides—that is, decides with the finitude and facticity of its life wholly 
disclosed to it—to lose itself in the ‘they’? What should we call Dasein then—authentic or 
inauthentic? Or authentically inauthentic? Secondly, if the warrant of the call of conscience is 
constituted by Dasein’s concern for itself, then does not Dasein have to be already in the mode 
of being of authenticity in order that the call be made? For if Dasein were wholly inauthentic 
it would be no longer concerned with its being as such.4 Is it the case, then, that Dasein is 
4Stephen Mulhall pursues this point in detail in his [17].
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 authentic as such? But then Heidegger insists that inauthenticity is the mode of being that 
Dasein inhabits always already and for the most part. Must it not be the case then, that Dasein 
is better understood as being in both modes simultaneously? A better picture, I suggest, might 
see authenticity and inauthenticity not as two exclusive modes, but as two poles of a con‐
tinuum on which the more Dasein’s semiosphere is configured in accordance with Dasein’s 
ultimate projects, the closer Dasein is to authenticity—ultimate projects being those aspects 
of Dasein’s motivational set that are conformed in full realisation of its being‐towards‐death. 
In this way, Dasein, as concerned being‐a‐self, would continually be summoned towards the 
‘outer layers’ and a ‘greater perspective’ of semiotic disclosure. And this summons would 
be conscience. The significances of any ‘inner’ layer would be able to be criticised from the 
perspective of a more authentic ‘outer’ layer; criticised, in the light of Dasein’s self‐concern, in 
terms of their justifiability.
An example would help here. Suppose, perhaps heeding Barthes’ analysis in The Fashion 
System, I am enthralled by fashionable clothes [18]. There is no doubt that such clothes and the 
various forms of media, publication and celebrity concerned with them constitute an  intricate 
semiotic web. Nonetheless, allowing my purchasing power, my sense of self‐ identity, the com‐
fort—both physical and emotional—I feel in the presence of others, etc., to be so  thoroughly 
determined by this semiosis might be something that, from a more fundamental perspective 
on the possibilities of my life, I may object to. On the other hand, I might not; I might decide, 
from an authentic perspective, that the fashion system is what I want to devote my life whole‐
heartedly to. In any case, the possibility of criticism is opened up. Beneath entire systems 
of meaning, individual signs may be subject to criticism from the same account. Suppose I 
construe myself authentically as post‐gender, or as post‐nationality, etc. I may find wholly 
unhelpful and to be avoided the application of the signs ‘male’ and ‘female’, the adjective 
‘English’, etc. I may want to resist carving the world up in this way. And this may be true both 
in regard to myself and in regard to others. I may take signs such as ‘Jew’ or ‘Muslim’ to con‐
note in my culture in a way incompatible with a more authentic perspective on human being 
that I endeavour to maintain.
5.2. Qua agent
So much for the normativity of Dasein insofar as it interprets and discloses. Qua agent, Dasein 
must also heed the summons. Lacan [19] uses the term ‘objet petit a’ to refer to the object of 
desire that is so ‘scopically’ basic such as to constitute the subject as such. Without wishing to 
do too much violence, either to Lacan’s concepts or to Heidegger’s, I think that this concept 
can be usefully imported into a discussion of the ethics of authenticity. The Heideggerian 
conscience—just like Lacanian psychoanalysis—is really telling us never to give up on our 
ultimate desire, to be resolute in our projection onto the possibilities of being that are chosen 
in the light of authenticity. This is the existential imperative, the enkratic principle. The objet 
petit a, the telos of such ultimate projects, configures the semiosphere as the lack around 
which it is arranged. Conscience thus calls for a particular semiotic configuration that it is 
up to us to realise as embodied agents in a factical world. I.e., the disclosure that the call of 
conscience is calling forth is one that our actions are required to realise, as the means to our 
ultimate teloi.
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In the language of practical reasoning—more familiar to moral philosophers—, conscience, 
on the analysis I have proposed, summons us qua agents to do that which we take ourselves 
to have overriding reason to do. Our ultimate desires, configured psychoanalysis tells us, 
around the ultimate ends of our subjectivity, ground reasons for acting in ways to attain 
or realise those ends. On this broadly instrumentalist account of practical reason, the more 
fundamental a desire is, the more overriding the reasons it grounds. The objet petit a, as the 
end of our ultimate desire, thus provides us with reasons for action that override all other 
reasons for action that we might have. Whilst what we take ourselves to have reason to do 
might not be the same as what we actually have reason to do (this is the thrust of the fero‐
cious contemporary debate between ‘externalism’ and ‘internalism’ about practical reason 
in moral philosophy), conscience, as the call resulting from the internal configuration of 
subjectivity, takes no notice of this: it calls us to do what we take ourselves to have overrid‐
ing reason to do.
5.3. The everyday notion of conscience
It may be rejoined that the analysis of conscience we have given misses many of the phenom‐
enological facts that are captured by the ordinary or everyday notion of conscience. It may be 
said that, no matter for what has been given so far, a semiotics of conscience must also capture 
the notions of guilt, of bad conscience, of the generally moral nature of conscience, as well 
as the fact that the call of conscience seems to sound only with regard to specific deeds—not 
all the time, or continually, as the analysis we have presented so far might seem to indicate. 
Certainly, a semiotic account of these everyday features of the notion of conscience needs 
to be given if our analysis is to be considered in any way comprehensive. Again, we can fol‐
low Heidegger’s lead here; he clearly distinguishes the existential interpretation of conscience 
from its ‘vulgar’ interpretation.
There are two ways in which the everyday notion of conscience and the existential inter‐
pretation might be related. On the one hand, one could argue that there is in fact more than 
one type of conscience—a plurality of consciences. Or, alternatively, one might argue that 
the everyday interpretation is the inauthentic disclosure of the existential call of conscience. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the latter that Heidegger proposes.
On this account, everyday, or inauthentic, Dasein misconstrues or misinterprets the con‐
science‐sign. Our semiotic tools give us a new way of characterising this mistake that Dasein 
makes. For the everyday notion of conscience:
1. The representamen/sign‐vehicle is a specific utterance: ‘You should not have done that!’ 
Its specificity does not mean that it actually comes to language and breaks the mode of 
silence; rather its specificity serves to conceal what is authentically disclosed in conscience, 
namely, Dasein as authentically concerned. Dasein is thus misled to focus, using language 
familiar from the later Heidegger, on beings, things, rather than on its being as such.
2. The sense/interpretant is the badness or wrongness of the deed that was done, the sense that 
Dasein has been immoral, and done something impermissible. Dasein ought not to have done it. 
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Thus Dasein’s responsibility is alluded to, but not in the sense of its responsibility for its being 
as such, but rather, merely, in the sense of its responsibility for a particular being—the deed 
that it ought not to have done.
3. The object/referent is Dasein’s impermissible deed itself, whatever it might have been. This 
is what the everyday conscience‐sign is drawing Dasein’s attention back to.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the everyday conscience‐
sign. In the first place, it is clear how significant the misunderstanding of the conscience‐sign 
of inauthentic Dasein is. It is significant enough for it to totally dissimulate the original sense 
of conscience and thus conceal the urgency of retrieving itself from the ‘they’. Structurally, 
this dissimulation operates by breaking up the original ontological unity of the semiotic 
moments of the conscience‐sign. In its everyday version, the semiotic moments are differ‐
entiated such that the sign becomes just one sign among others, a standard Peircean symbol, 
rather than sui generis and triune. Its special particularity and urgency is thereby lost. In 
Heideggerian language, being as such is concealed in favour of the disclosure of particular 
beings. Given the semiotic account above, it could be added: semiosis as such is concealed 
in favour of particular semiotic events. Thus the proper significance of the conscience‐sign 
collapses. Calling it the ‘voice of God’ only serves to compound, rather than to overturn, the 
dissimulation.
This is not a random misfortune for Dasein, argues Heidegger. Rather, it is one way that 
Dasein copes with the anxiety it experiences about its responsibility for itself. Its responsibil‐
ity for its being as such is dissimulated to resemble a liability for a mere deed, which is at least 
superficially comforting for Dasein. The conscience‐sign is deliberately, if not consciously, 
misunderstood—a misunderstanding which is just another way of Dasein caring for itself. 
Dasein cleverly, if unknowingly, figures out a way of avoiding having to heed the conscience‐
sign as it authentically signs.
Given the moral connotations of the everyday conscience‐sign, the foregoing analysis 
warrants a comment on the status that should be afforded to moral thinking. Suppose the 
enkratic principle as outlined above conflicts with the demands of morality as ordinarily 
understood—i.e., suppose, for any given agent, that the former prescribes one action, 
whilst the latter prescribes another, and the given agent cannot pursue both. What should 
the agent choose? Whilst we may not be in a position to answer this question decisively, 
it can at least be pointed out that the normativity of the call of conscience subtends the 
normativity of ordinary morality, since whilst the agent may have good reason to adhere 
to the demands of ordinary morality, whatever they may be in any given situation, the 
agent has, on the account above, an overriding reason to adhere to the prescriptions of its 
ultimate concerns. In other words, it will always be more rational for the agent to heed the 
authentic call of conscience above considerations of ordinary morality if there is ever a 
contradiction between the two. The enkratic principle is thus more fundamentally binding 
than any ordinary moral principle could be. Indeed, on this account, ordinary morality 
might tend to appear, as Heidegger thought, as a dissimulation of the authentic norma‐
tivity of existence.
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6. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the semiotic analysis of the conscience‐sign has revealed its uniqueness and 
importance amongst signs. This has made the lacuna of it being ignored hitherto by semioti‐
cians all the more striking and curious. Heidegger, of course, traced this sort of ignorance in 
every instance back to the inevitable inauthenticity of everyday thinking, even of the most 
rigorous philosophical thinking. It has also disclosed fertile paths for new research:
It indicates that the source of semiosis as such is our concern for ourselves. Daniel Chandler 
begins his well‐known introductory text on semiotics with the words ‘We seem as a species 
to be driven by a desire to make meanings’ [20]. And this is characteristic of what could be 
construed to be the semioticians most basic mistake: it is not that we desire to make meanings; 
rather, we desire—and that creates meanings. Concern is the origin of semiosis. Elsewhere, I have 
tried to reduce semiotic configurations down to their original starting points in the teleologi‐
cal schemes that are grounded by such concern [21].
It also opens up the possibility of an ethically engaged semiotics that can propound fundamental 
normative justifications. Indeed, once conscience has been legitimately construed as the sign‐
ing of signification as a whole, it is not clear how semiotics can avoid becoming ethical—in the 
sense of critical. That it has endeavoured, by and large, to remain purely ‘theoretical’, practi‐
cally neutral, is, on this account, not a strength but a weakness. Understanding that processes of 
semiosis are always rooted in concern for self and that concern for self has essentially a norma‐
tive dimension or aspect compels a way of thinking about semiotics that is inherently critical. 
In this case, the semiotic analysis of conscience has the potential to reorientate fundamentally 
semiotics research.
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